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As companies engage to help build municipal capacity in South Africa, it may be useful to situate 
these efforts within the experience of international attempts to drive good governance and 
development through ‘state building’. Analysis provides warnings about an exclusive focus on the 
institutions and capacities of the formal government, with attendant risks of failed projects or even 
perverse effects that reinforce division and increase resistance to change. It suggests that a broader 
lens on the society and the political economy may be necessary to conceptualize and mobilize 
sufficient coalitions for positive change. And it provides some guidance to companies to the specific 
risks and opportunities they face as change agents. The discussion below draws substantially from 
studies of particularly conflict-prone environments, both because of the availability of evidence, and 
because of the relevance to the South African municipal context. 
 
The default approach to development is to build government institutions 
The received wisdom of the past decades of international development policy is that ‘state building’ 
– helping ‘reformers to build effective, legitimate, and resilient state institutions, capable of 
engaging productively with their people to promote sustained development’ (OECD 2007) – is at the 
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heart of ‘development, peace and stability’ (OECD 2008). Under this thinking, ‘Regressed economies 
and societies need a form of assistance that is directly related to rebuilding social, economic and 
state institutions’ (Wohlmuth 1998, p. 42). The 2013 Report of the High-Level Panel  
 
of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, commissioned by the UN Secretary 
General, calls for more attention to ‘effective, open and accountable institutions for all’ (UN 2013, p. 
9). Or the words of the African Development Bank, ‘Building legitimate and capable political and 
justice institutions, as well as resilient economic institutions, is at the heart of overcoming fragility 
and building resilient states’ (AfDB 2014, p. 9). The evidence of a broad correlation between sound 
institutions and accelerated development – in the mid-1990s, many development agencies 
recognised that the effect of aid on economic growth and poverty reduction was greater in countries 
with ‘good’ policies and institutions (Burnside & Dollar 1998), and Japan’s state-led development 
approach, as well as the restructuring of the economies of Eastern Europe, also emphasised that the 
state can be an important development catalyst (Wade 1996) – had ushered in an era of what 
Harvard professor Dani Rodrik calls ‘institutions fundamentalism’ (Rodrik 2006, p. 979). The 
hypothesis (at least implicitly) is that, ‘if we get the institutions right, we get development right.’ 
Such thinking is echoed in the municipal reform debate in South Africa: as states the Local 
Government Turnaround Strategy, ‘The aims of democratizing our society and growing our economy 
inclusively can only be realized through a responsive, accountable, effective and efficient Local 
Government system that is part of a Developmental State’ (DCGTA 2009). 
 
Focus on institutions may all the same be a weak lever for reform 
International state building interventions are typically designed to fill institutional gaps identified 
using a fragility framework (such as that of the OECD) that assesses, for example, deficiencies in rule 
of law and control of corruption; government effectiveness and regulatory quality; ease of doing 
business; or healthcare capabilities (OECD 2015, p. 42). Similarly, in the South African municipal 
context, the key objective is ‘to rebuild and improve the basic requirements for a functional, 
responsive, effective, efficient, and accountable developmental local government’ (DCGTA 2009, p. 
19). Officials are sent on courses; regulatory reforms are promoted; or investments in healthcare 
delivery are made. Yet in the aggregate, attempts at international state building – particularly those 
based on the construction of an idealised liberal state model encompassing a working and 
accountable bureaucracy, a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, and the capacity to 
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deliver on basic services to individuals within the state’s territory (Schwarz 2005) – have little to 
show (Boege, Brown, Clemens & Nola 2009). This seems to be because state building is at its heart 
not about filling institutional gaps; authentic state-building  
 
evolves from new power relationships negotiated between the different actors that make up the 
social and political order (OECD 2010, p. 9). Without these underlying political transitions, officials 
return from their courses to the same dysfunctional system, unable to change it. Infrastructure 
projects are be subject to the same corrupt influences or political rivalries that inhibited inclusive 
economic growth before. Since ‘the evolution of a state’s relationship with society is at the heart of 
state-building’ (OECD 2011, p. 11), new laws and institutions need to emerge from socio-political 
consensus over their purpose and goals.  
 
Attempts at government reform often have perverse impacts 
Thus, even at best, ‘state-building is not a quick process,’ (Ibid., p. 60) and is predictably contentious. 
At worst, prematurely focusing on the laws and institutions prioritized by outside reformers can 
have perverse impacts. The imposition of economic models, laws or institutions on societies in which 
there is no underlying consensus about their desirability, or appropriate mechanisms for their 
implementation, often ‘tests these institutions and the societies that depend on them, sometimes to 
breaking point’. (Ibid.) Indeed, where there are unresolved tensions – between national and regional 
authorities over the control of private-sector activities, as in Peru, between traditional and state 
authorities over the allocation of land, as in Uganda, or between those who promote and those who 
oppose a free-market capitalist system, as in India – legal and institutional reforms become ‘a 
weapon in social conflict’ (Turk 1976, p. 276) wielded by the powerful. It is a long-standing postulate 
of law and development that, absent sufficient consensus, such attempted reforms therefore 
‘generate and exacerbate conflicts rather than resolving or softening them’ (Ibid.). The degree to 
which the Municipal Systems Amendment Act’s provision that office-bearers of political parties be 
barred from occupying managerial positions is flouted, or the evident resistance to municipal reform 
when it threatens local political or business interests (Lund 2014), suggest that there is a long road 
before the social consensus is in place that will enable effective municipal institutional reform.  
 
It must also be acknowledged that some governments in power may be ‘statist and illiberal’ – as 
have been characterized, for example, the ruling parties of Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Sudan – with 
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violence borne of revolutionary roots playing a central role ‘in their political praxis and vision’ (Jones 
& Soares de Oliveira 2013, p. 5). In the absence of some underlying commitment to sharing  
 
power and access to resources, institutional reforms promoted from the outside may be predictably 
subverted to ensure that ‘institutions enabling and protecting rents extraction’ are ‘protected and 
buttressed’, while the ‘institutions of power and revenue sharing’ are ‘side-lined and impaired’, with 
the result that attempted reforms contribute to further ‘monopolization, elite predation, and 
usurpation’ (Amundsen 2014). The currency of the ‘state capture’ debate in South Africa, as well the 
persistent use of organised violence to advance local political agendas, suggest that these dynamics 
obtain at least to some extent in South Africa.  
 
Finally, failed reforms themselves can lead to a downward cycle of conflict and institutional 
ossification. A study of conflict in the extractives industries – that might well have been written in 
the context of South African municipal service delivery – concluded that, ‘When governments fail to 
deliver and there are allegations of corruption, this increases the chances of populist movements or 
new governments calling for radical redistribution of wealth’ (Stevens, Kooroshy, Lahn & Lee 2013, 
p. 93). In turn, the checks and balances of the liberal system, including political protests, are 
increasingly seen by governments in power ‘not as a basic form of democratic political action but 
rather as a threat that must be controlled’ (Branch & Mampilly 2015). These reinforcing dynamics 
close the space for reflection on, or commitment to, genuine reform. 
 
Efforts at change must acknowledge the political economy reinforcing weak institutions  
This analysis should make clear that it is insufficient to pursue a laundry list of desired municipal 
capabilities and institutional improvements, lest efforts be wasted or even reinforce local fragility. 
Reformers must first understand why undesirable causes and conditions are present in a particular 
context before trying to fix them. In particular: 
 What are the power relationships or institutional arrangements that reinforce rather than 
address political fragmentation, mistrust, exclusion and grievance?  
 Given that no community chooses poverty, insecurity, or poor service delivery, what has 




Asking these questions, reformers will be reminded that a municipality is more than its government; 
they may more usefully come to think of it as ‘a community under municipal government 
jurisdiction.’ This introduces a normative component: the goal of analysis and intervention becomes 
the lives of citizens, not the government per se. But it also has an analytic component – a healthy 
municipality is comprised of much more than a capable and functioning government, requiring us to 
understand the entire system – and a programmatic component – It is unlikely that we can achieve 
positive reform within a community system by concentrating efforts on the government, which is 
after all only one node. Analysis will inevitably lead to understanding of the municipality as a ‘hybrid 
political order’ (OECD 2011) in which the municipal government is only one source of authority 
among others (and often not a dominant one) within the community, competing with political 
parties, neighbourhood and business associations, religious organisations, and even criminal gangs 
for resources and political power. This perspective helps reformers usefully move from measuring 
‘gaps’ and what is not there – for example, jobs, security, or municipal service delivery – to assessing 
what is there – powerful dynamics inhibiting change. They become more conscious of how the very 
dynamics of political fragmentation, mistrust, exclusion and grievance that make a context fragile in 
the first place also undermine programmes meant to address it. 
 
The building blocks for effective change can increasingly be considered mainstream 
Turning this perspective into positive reform efforts requires a shift in thinking from the end state or 
desired outcomes of municipal capability-building towards the ‘art of the possible’ of broad-based 
reforms: how those so inclined – whether they are within government, members of the broader 
society, or those trying to support positive change from outside – can gain traction on positive 
changes despite complex socio-political dynamics. Qualitative analysis performed by knowledgeable 
parties on the ground needs to address, in peacebuilding parlance, what divides people and what 
connects them, as well as the dynamics by which divisions are reinforced and connections inhibited. 
Through this analysis domains in which it may be possible for a sufficient coalition for change to 
emerge, as well as the kinds of interventions that might help them do so, can be identified. Success 
is achieved by combining an understanding of the entire conflict system – defined by the particular 
social, political and economic dynamics among a specific set of actors in a certain time and place – 





A toolbox of approaches can help reformers move towards this ‘bottom up’ rather than ‘top down’ 
perspective on state building and institutional reform, focusing on transition pacts among multiple 
stakeholders (Wennmann 2010). These approaches are well enough established in peacebuilding 
and development to broadly be considered mainstream. They are underpinned by reasonably well-
understood principles and mechanisms of action at the municipal level. These approaches can in 
general terms be described as a set of interconnected building blocks (Ganson & Wennmann 2016, 
ch. 5):  
 
 Institutionalised mechanisms or networks for monitoring the local context 
Making sense of the local context is challenging in rumour-rich and information-poor environments. 
This is in part because data generation does not occur in a political vacuum; controlling information 
is an expression of political power that in turn favours or disfavours different interest groups. 
Additionally, stakeholders will often not trust information that they have not themselves had a hand 
in collecting, due to legacies of mistrust. Increasingly, these interrelated barriers to insight and 
analysis in complex and dynamic environments are overcome through the use of ‘observatories’ that 
function to generate data, provide analysis or give advice to decision-makers to strengthen 
policymaking (Gilgen & Tracey 2011). They may make use of a community-based monitoring systems 
(CBMS) to reduce disputes over data and analysis as different actors understand the assessments 
that underlie them (Ibid.) 
 
 Dialogue that builds sufficient consensus for action 
Here the goal is to progressively enlarge the circle of actors aligned around a concrete vision for the 
future, ensuring that it be consensual, that it be as broadly owned as possible, and there be no 
major gap between the vision and the capacities of … stakeholders to deliver that vision (Simpson 
2010). Dialogue processes often need to compensate for mechanisms of the formal government that 
lack sufficient legitimacy, nurturing ‘a shared understanding among key political actors on principles’ 
(Papagianni 2014, p. 11). Their success rests at least in part on rigorous stakeholder mapping (which 
can be supported by the observatory function), as well as on an expanded understanding of ‘who 
counts’ in efforts towards stability and peaceful development. As a major study on legitimacy and 
peace processes concluded, what is critical for a process to be legitimate is popular consent – that is, 







 Proactive conflict prevention and resolution interventions 
‘Fragile contexts don’t take surprises well. Reactions are much stronger. There is no button to press 
to calm down an angry population that feels betrayed’ (Ganson 2013, p. 119). Systems capable of 
preventing the escalation of conflict or violence are therefore often required to keep reform efforts 
from being undermined by broader conflict dynamics. These may take a variety of innovative forms. 
In Kenya, for example, a group of technologists and civic activists built the Ushahidi platform – since 
deployed in hundreds of places around the world – in response to election violence, allowing the 
public to report in real time and enable swifter responses (Puig Larrauri, Davies, Ledesma & Welch 
2015). Initiatives Increasingly draw inspiration from the insight of public health experts that violence 
spreads like a disease, and that it is therefore amenable to strategic interruption points. 
Programmes deploy trusted members of a local community – from ex-drug runners or gang leaders 
to religious figures or elders – as ‘violence interrupters’. The fact that these local leaders acting as 
mediators are connected to, and trusted by, important local constituencies has been found to build 
trust in processes and outcomes (Mason 2009).  
 
 A backbone support organisation that facilitates expert and neutral assistance 
These interdependent facets of local change efforts will often require professional and 
institutionalized support to coordinate and sustain them; as the G20 High Level Panel on 
Infrastructure reminded us, partnerships that bring diverse actors together ’require their own 
infrastructure’ (HLPI 2014, p. 3). Ad hoc processes convened directly by stakeholders can die from 
the exhaustion of planning and managing complex collaborative initiatives that are outside the core 
mandate or expertise of any participant; they may also fall prey to wrangling among the players as 
one or another is perceived to be manipulating the process to achieve its preferred outcome. A 
‘backbone support organization’ that provides services such as neutral facilitation or mediation, 
technology and communication, data collection and reporting, and administrative support is 
therefore increasingly seen as a critical enabler of complex collaborative efforts (Kania & Kramer 




When strategically combined, these deceptively simple building blocks – trustworthy data, 
collaborative analysis, progressively expanded coalitions for change, interventions to address 
corrosive conflict risks, and sustained institutional support by an honest broker – have proven  
 
remarkably effective in the municipal context, for example, in the reduction of severe urban 
violence. One key success factor appears to be the relentless prioritization that follows from these 
combined approaches. In Colombia in the mid-1990s, for example, the mayors of Medellín and 
Bogotá represented new political coalitions for anti-violence with a degree of political independence 
from traditional parties. A broad coalition across left and right, the media and a large part of the 
business community enabled policies for solving critical problems to take priority over the partisan 
interests of certain economic elites or municipal bureaucracies (Gutierrez, Pinto, Arenas, Guzman & 
Gutierrez 2013). These combined approaches also appear to help build will and capacity for more 
integrated approaches. In the Dominican Republic, for example, a programme to address crime and 
drug trafficking in the Capotillo neighbourhood of Santo Domingo in 2005 simultaneously increased 
the number of patrols by specially trained police in high-crime areas; provided new street lighting 
and new public recreational areas; invested in young people by providing new classrooms in schools, 
cultural workshops and sports clinics; and reached out to the general public with literacy and civic 
education initiatives. The programme recorded an 85% decline in assaults and robberies during its 
first two months, and a 70% reduction in homicides over eight months (UNODC & World Bank 2007, 
p. 124). 
 
Tailored approaches can be effective despite local fragility 
Just as importantly, these approaches succeed in the face of social division, legacies of grievance, 
weak institutions, lack of trust in government, pressing socio-economic challenges, and the presence 
of spoilers content to exploit conflict to meet their narrowly defined interests – that is to say, the 
very conditions that define the fragility requiring intervention in the first place. As noted above, 
contexts are typically fragile at least in part because the dominant political structures contribute to 
problems rather than to their solutions. Yet because these systems are functioning to achieve some 
purpose – protecting the power and authority of a particular elite, for example – they are highly 
resistant to change. Responses to poor municipal governance and service delivery may therefore fail 
because they proffer advice or prioritise regulatory or institutional reforms against an idealized 
model even in the absence of any underlying socio-political consensus for their implementation. 
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Successful approaches, on the other hand, work around, and where possible even with, prevailing 
socio-political dynamics (Ganson & Wennmann 2016, ch. 5): 
 
 Party engagement on the basis of their partisan interests  
Powerful actors may need to be engaged on the basis of their own agendas. In Kenya, for example, 
the business community remained peripheral to efforts to contain widespread and brutal election 
violence up through 2007. But as it became apparent how this had contributed to a 24% reduction in 
flower exports at least a 40% decline in tourism, and US$2m per day in export losses from the tea 
industry (Rukavina de Vidovgrad 2015, p. 5), the business community made an affirmative choice to 
contribute to conflict prevention initiatives in the run up to the 2013 elections.  
 
 
 Vertical linkages to influential actors at regional or national levels 
When a local councillor belonging to the ANC was implicated in fomenting xenophobic violence for 
partisan political purposes in the Breede River Municipality of South Africa, the mediator was able to 
convince party leaders to intervene in the interest of maintaining national control over local 
structures (Koetze 2015). Although such problems present locally, their resolution requires 
relationships and channels of communication between local, regional and national levels of the 
system. When institutionalized, these linkages may be characterized as ‘infrastructures for peace’ 
(Kumar & De la Haye 2011, p. 5). They often draw inspiration from the experience of South Africa’s 
National Peace Secretariat, which  established 11 regional and more than 260 local peace 
committees, allowing issues around the implementation of the National Peace Accord to be 
managed locally if possible but also enabling them to be quickly escalated to another level of 
influence if necessary (Spies 2002).  
 
 Building from existing social and political capital and functioning institutions 
Reformers typically begin with a gap analysis of local municipalities, leading to the familiar litany of 
corrupt governments, divided communities and failed institutions. Yet the absence of functioning 
government institutions should not be mistaken for the absence of governance mechanisms or 
public service delivery, especially at sub-national levels. In an urban township where the police are 
unwilling or unable to act, neighbourhood committees may arrest suspects, try them in informal 
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courts and mete out punishment; churches and mosques may provide literacy training. These locally 
legitimate structures and institutions represent ‘a different and genuine political order’ (Boege et al. 
2009, p. 606) from which development efforts can build. Conversely, failure to acknowledge and 
support local capacities for development can damage mutual support networks and patterns of 
trust, undermining communities’ resilience and allowing conflicts to fester (Bardouille-Crema, 
Chigas, & Miller 2013). 
 
 Moving beyond stereotypes and typical actors 
Finding and nurturing local capacities for positive change may require looking past stereotypes in to 
where real interests and capacities may lie. In Sierra Leone, for example, the Bo Bike Riders’ 
Association is a local motorcycle taxi cooperative made up of thousands of young men who for the 
most part previously belonged to one of the world’s most brutal insurgencies, the Revolutionary 
United Front. Ex-combatants are at a high risk of returning to violence, and are often counted among 
those perceived to welcome conflict as a tool to pursue money, power, revenge or self-
aggrandisement – and thus as difficult or impossible to engage. Yet the Bike Riders’ Association was 
a critical partner in the 2007 Campaign for Violence-Free Elections, using its members’ ubiquitous 
presence across the region to raise the alarm when violence threatened and, having defined itself as 
‘a peaceful, non-political organization’, to ‘move into the community to resolve conflicts and prevent 
violence’ (Ganson & Svensson 2010). 
 
 Intervention in the more acceptable forms of expertise and advice 
Many actors in difficult places are not necessarily indisposed to outside intervention, particularly 
when it comes in the form of expertise and advice rather than a pre-packaged plan or solution.  
Particularly when parties become ‘unable to communicate with each other, unable to think of a 
solution that could be attractive to the other side as well as themselves, unable to … turn the zero-
sum conflict into a positive-sum solution, and unable to turn from commitment and a winning 
mentality to problem solving and solutions to grievances’ (Zartman 1995, p. 20), facilitating learning 
from one context to another may be a role of particular importance, as when South African 
experience was able to inspire the participants in the Northern Ireland peace process to break 
through deadlocks. Additionally, offering only advice and experience that the parties themselves will 
filter and apply in light of their superior understanding of local dynamics helps to protect against the 
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all-too common failure of interventions that are disconnected from local social and political realities 
(See, e.g., Anderson, Brown & Jean 2013). 
 
Taken together, these approaches to catalysing positive change despite complex and often self-
defeating socio-political dynamics suggest the utility of structured, compensatory mechanisms 
within fragile systems. In some quarters, there is a ‘paradigm shift from the “good governance” 
agenda of neo-liberal state building to a focus on “arrangements that work”’ (Meagher, De Herdt & 
Titeca 2014, p. 2). State builders may be adopting the perspective that ‘what matters is the 
function, rather than the form of institutions’ – a principle that is broadly accepted by development 
practitioners (Centre for the Future of the State 2010, p. 21) – such that the legitimate needs of 
stakeholders can be met even in the absence of a legitimate, uncontested state. Tending to operate 
in socio-political ‘grey’ spaces that are neither apart from nor fully part of the fragile state structures 
(Ganson & Wennmann 2012, p. 4), informal institutions can build more inclusive forums as they 
analyse issues, interrupt conflict, find solutions and resolve grievances. The actions of ‘the other’ 
become more knowable and more predictable, opening doors to new possibilities for action that 
cuts across pre-existing conflict divides. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the relationship 
and trust-building achieved through such efforts can allow for local progress, even if national fragility 
persists (Hohe 2004; Anderson & Wallace 2013). 
 
Companies face a balancing act in state building efforts 
As powerful political and economic actors, corporations as advocates for, or participants in, 
municipal ‘state building’ efforts face risks from both action and inaction. To maintain internal 
support within the company for municipal engagement, change agents within the corporation may 
be pressed to pursue municipal reforms that address company interests, such as increased technical 
capacity or regulatory reform. They may be susceptible to the elite perspective that ‘bureaucratic 
enclaves of excellence and huge infrastructure projects can qualitatively reconfigure domestic 
political-economic systems’ (Jones and Soares de Oliveira 2013, p. 6). Interventions that focus solely 
on the government in power may in fact be ‘effective’ in that they create new capabilities or provide 
new resources. Yet if these efforts proceed ‘without any fundamental political restructuring’ and 
avoid addressing broader domestic concerns over the distribution of benefits and the legitimacy of 
government in the eyes of the population (Englebert & Portelance 2015), they risk – in addition to 
the perverse effects discussed above – civil society complaints that that companies are merely taking 
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action that ‘aligns national policies to corporate interests’ (See, e.g., Obenland 2014). On the other 
hand, failing to respond to pressing needs for jobs, security and justice will lead to further division 




Companies that do aspire to roles as catalysts for positive change may find that they are themselves 
facing capabilities gaps that make those of the municipality they seek to assist pale in comparison. 
Mary Anderson, an authority on intervention in conflict-prone environments, noted that ‘peace is 
not an area for amateurs’ (Anderson 2008, p. 125). For companies to effectively engage in complex 
socio-political environments, they must ‘perform accurate and up-to-date conflict analysis; establish 
comfortable, trusting, and transparent relationships with diverse people who may not share their 
values; use specialized mediation skills to identify common concerns that can unite antagonists while 
also respecting fundamental differences and opposing positions; and have the ability to be calm and 
comfortable in situations of danger, threat, and emotional and physical stress’. In what is perhaps a 
pronounced understatement, she concludes that these ‘are not common, everyday skills found 
among corporate managers’ (Ibid.) Furthermore, attempts to outsource these functions may result 
in a kind of corporate dyspraxia, in which companies fail to act effectively even on known risks to 
themselves or others, due to governance and management systems failures (Ganson 2014). 
 
The starting point seems to be for company leaders to admit that business is part and parcel of the 
fragile municipal context, including its complex socio-political dynamics. Investments, operations, 
government and stakeholder relations and civic engagement are all part of a political economy, and 
inherently political. This remains difficult to accept for many actors, whether in government, civil 
society forums or corporate boardrooms. As one executive put it, ‘Weren’t they telling me just a few 
decades ago to get out of politics?’ (Ganson 2014, p. 129). Yet to make sense of and address 
dysfunctional municipal dynamics, corporate leaders must both admit, and claim the legitimacy to 
assert, business interests in ‘political’ matters. By advocating and providing opportunities for the 
broadest possible coalition to ‘participate in, influence, and share control over development 
initiatives, decisions, and resources’ (EIR 2003, p. 18), companies can support the hard work of 
identifying the players, issues, and dynamics that present opportunities to build sufficient coalitions 
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